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of these choices, rendering a definition by structural induction on programs-as is the standard approach for defining wp semantics-impossible. We treat this problem in detail in the article and provide an operational semantics for nondeterministic programs using Markov decision processes.
As an application of our semantics, we treat three program transformations. The first transformation removes observe statements from a program by hoisting them through the probabilistic choices in the program. This technique thus modifies the likelihood of probabilistic choices in the program based on the Boolean conditions in its observe statements. The result is a program without conditioning. This transformation is similar in nature to the one in [42] , where all programs are assumed to be terminating. Due to the treatment of possible divergence, in our setting, the transformation to eliminate conditioning is different and more involved. This transformation is complemented by an alternative transformation for removing conditioning. Let c be a program with observations. We transform this program by repeatedly sampling executions from c until the sampled execution satisfies all its observations. If during a program execution we encounter that an observe is violated, we restart the program as being fresh. This comes at the expense of introducing a loop. This program transformation has similarities to the application of rejection sampling to conditional probabilities as described in, e.g., [49] . These two program transformations thus show that conditioning is syntactic sugar as it can be either resolved in the wp calculations or be replaced by a loop. Our third and last program transformation goes in the reverse direction: in case the successive loop iterations are statistically independent, a loop can be replaced by an observe statement, which has the same effect.
Besides being of interest on their own right, a particularly appealing application of these transformations is to ease the reasoning about probabilistic program termination, a problem that is already known to be strictly harder than in the nonprobabilistic case [32] . Since the presented transformations are valid irrespective of the termination probability of the original programs, we can use the transformed-possibly simpler-programs to reason about the termination probability of the original programs.
Organisation of the Article. Section 2 provides an informal introduction to our approach and introduces our running example for this article. Section 3 introduces the imperative probabilistic programming language pGCL extended with conditions. Section 4 presents our wp semantics, while Section 5 presents the operational semantics and the correspondence between both semantics. Section 6 extends the operational semantics for a language incorporating a nondeterministic choice and presents our impossibility result for combining conditioning and nondeterminism in an inductive wp semantics. Section 7 covers the three program transformations that remove conditioning and that replace a loop by an observe. Section 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 concludes the article. Omitted proofs from the main part of the article are included in the appendix.
This work builds on a previous work from the authors [31] and extends it with the following contributions: a proof rule for reasoning about the conditional pre-expectation of loops, a more thorough study of the properties of the conditional wp transformer, a program transformation that replaces loops with no information flow across iterations by a simple observation, and proofs of all the results. A high-level overview can be found in [34] .
OVERVIEW
We provide an informal and high-level overview of our two semantic models for conditioned probabilistic programs. Further details are elaborated in Sections 4 and 5. As a running example we use the "goldfish-piranha" problem from [51] :
One fish is contained within the confines of an opaque fishbowl. The fish is equally likely to be a piranha or a goldfish. A sushi lover throws a piranha into the fish 4:6 F. Olmedo et al. bowl alongside the other fish. Then, immediately, before either fish can devour the other, one of the fish is blindly removed from the fishbowl. The fish that has been removed from the bowl turns out to be a piranha. What is the probability that the fish that was originally in the bowl by itself was a piranha?
We can formalize this problem in terms of the program in Figure 1 . The translation is straightforward: variable f 1 represents the fish that was already in the fishbowl at the beginning, variable f 2 the (piranha) fish that was introduced afterward, and variable rem the fish that was removed from the bowl at the end. The fact that this fish turned out to be a piranha is encoded using the observe statement in Line 4. To solve the problem, we must determine the probability that f 1 = pir upon the program termination.
Despite being modeled by a four-line program, the goldfish-piranha problem is sophisticated enough to illustrate all the essential aspects of both our semantic models.
Operational Semantics
We present our operational model for c fish first, as we believe it is the most intuitive and easiest to grasp. We model the program as a probabilistic transition system that reflects all possible program runs along with their probabilities. The transition system is depicted in Figure 2 . States of the transition system represent states of the program execution; they are tagged with the program line after which they occur. For example, state of the transition system reflects that the program state f 1 → gold, f 2 → pir, rem → pir is reached after Line 3 of the program execution. In particular, symbol "*" in a variable slot indicates that the program has not set its value yet. To reflect the random nature of the program, some transitions are probabilistic. In this case, a state includes multiple outgoing edges, each of them labeled with the respective probability.
The construction of the transition system is as follows: Before starting the program execution, the program state is unknown; in the transition system, this is denoted by the initial state . In Line 1, the program sets f 1 to gold or to pir with the same likelihood, 1 /2; in the transition system, we move, correspondingly, to states and , with respective probabilities 1 /2. In Line 2, the program sets f 2 to pir; in the transition system, we then move from the two previous states to states and , respectively. The program then goes through Line 3 and the construction of the transition system proceeds as for Line 1. Finally, Line 4 of the program contains an observation. From state , the observation is violated; we signal this by transitioning to "undesired" state . The other two states reachable after Line 4, namely, and , represent, on the contrary, valid final program states as they passed the observation.
The transition system in Figure 2 describes the behavior of program c fish . From the system we can see that the program admits four runs. One of them is blocked because it violates the observation. The other three are valid program runs; two of them yield final state f 1 → pir, f 2 → pir, rem → pir and the remaining run yields state f 1 → gold, f 2 → pir, rem → pir .
We can easily determine the probability Pr[c fish : f 1 = pir] that the program establishes f 1 = pir by examining the transition system. Due to the observation in Line 4, only the program runs that avoid the undesired state remain. Their probabilities are normalized so that they sum up to one. We can thus compute Pr[c fish : f 1 = pir] as the quotient between (1) the accumulated probabilities of all runs that elude " " and establish f 1 = pir, and (2) the accumulated probabilities of all runs that elude " ".
This readily yields
Pr c fish :
and turning to our motivating problem, it says that the fish originally in the bowl happened to be a piranha with probability 2 /3. In Section 5, we will see that the transition system in Figure 2 slightly deviates from the actual transition system that we propose for program c fish (cf. Figure 6 ). We deliberately did this to reduce technicalities and make the overview as accessible as possible. Despite these deviations, the model herein presented captures the essence of our operational semantics in a faithful and comprehensive manner.
Weakest Pre-Expectation Semantics
The other semantic model that we propose for conditioned programs is a quantitative extension of Dijkstra's weakest precondition semantics. There, the meaning of a classic sequential program c with state space S is given by the predicate transformer wp[c] : (S → {0, 1}) → (S → {0, 1}).
Given postcondition Q, the weakest precondition wp[c](Q ) returns, for each initial state, 1 if the program establishes the postcondition and 0 if the program does not. For a probabilistic program, however, this binary outcome is not sufficient. Take, for instance, program c fish . We can say neither that it establishes postcondition f 1 = pir nor that it fails to do so. Instead, it establishes the postcondition with a certain probability, 2 /3. To handle probabilistic programs, it is thus necessary For an unconditioned program c, the transformer wp[c] can in fact be defined by induction on the structure of c [38] . For conditioned programs, we observe, however, that this compositionality breaks down. To overcome this problem, recall Equation (1) . In a conditioned program, the probability of any postexpectation [Q] can be computed as the quotient of two other probabilities. Our key observation here is that this pair of probabilities-in contrast to their quotient-do admit an inductive definition, following the program structure. To extend the notion of weakest preexpectation to conditioned programs, we therefore propose the use of an inductive transformer cwp that operates over pairs of expectations. The transformer works as follows: As input, we provide a pair whose first component is the postexpectation [Q] of interest, and whose second component is the constant postexpectation 1. The transformer then outputs a pair of pre-expectations, whose quotient yields the probability of establishing Q. The first component of the pair represents the probability that c passes all observations and establishes Q, whereas the second component represents the probability that c passes all observations (cf. the enumeration above Equation (1)). For instance, for our goldfish-piranha example, we obtain
Transformer cwp is defined by induction on the program structure. Following the rules presented in Section 4, we can easily establish the above equation; detailed calculations are provided in Example 4.2.
THE PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
For describing probabilistic programs, we employ the conditional probabilistic guarded command language (cpGCL for short), a simple-but powerful-imperative language extended with probabilistic choices and observe statements to endow it with a probabilistic behavior. Formally, it is given by the following grammar:
Here, x belongs to V, the set of program variables; E is an expression over V and G denotes, in particular, an expression of Boolean type; and p is a probability parameter in [0, 1]. Except for probabilistic choices and observations, all other language constructs are standard and require no further explanation. {c 1 } [p] {c 2 } represents a probabilistic choice between programs c 1 and c 2 , where c 1 is executed with probability p and c 2 with probability 1−p. observe G represents a conditioning (in the sense of conditional probability) to the distribution of program runs. The effect of such an instruction is to block all program runs violating G and rescale the probability of the remaining runs so that they sum up to one.
Remark (Dynamical Probabilities).
In the probabilistic choices, instead of parameters p ∈ [0, 1], we could have used arbitrary functions p : S → [0, 1] mapping the current program state to a probability as discussed, e.g., in [54] . This would not change our semantics fundamentally. However, this would clutter the presentation and we will only need such constructs in the program transformation given in Section 7.1.
Example 3.1. To clarify this, consider the following two programs differing only in the presence of an observation and let us examine the probability that each of them establishes x = 0: Program c 1 admits all (four) runs, two of which satisfy x = 0; for this program, the probability that x = 0 is 1 /3. Program c 2 -due to the observation requiring x+y = 0-admits only two runs, only one of them satisfying x = 0; for this program, the probability that x = 0 is
The normalization factor in the denominator corresponds to the probability of a run that passes the observe-statement.
A cpGCL program without observations such as c 1 will be called unconditioned. In the remainder, we use syntactic sugar for describing programs like c 1 or c 2 . Concretely, we abbreviate a probabilistic choice {x : 2 and, when possible, we collapse sequences of consecutive assignments like x 1 := E 1 ; . . . ; x n := E n into a single compound assignment x 1 , . . . , x n := E 1 , . . . , E n . This abbreviation was used before, e.g., for describing program c fish .
As for cpGCL semantics, program states correspond to variable valuations. That is, a (program) state s is a mapping from variables (in V) to values and we call S the set of all program states. We assume that the set V of variables is finite, and that each variable can take countably many values, e.g., the rational numbers. By abuse of notation, we also write s (E) for the value of expression E in state s.
Given the discrete nature of (binary) probabilistic choices, cpGCL induces only discrete distributions. In other words, the distribution of final states obtained by executing a cpGCL program from a given initial state is always discrete. The treatment of continuous distributions is out of the scope of this presentation.
WEAKEST PRE-EXPECTATION SEMANTICS
We now recall the weakest pre-expectation semantics of probabilistic programs and extend it to cpGCL to incorporate conditioning. We study some general properties of this semantic extension and present a proof rule to reason about loops.
Expectation Transformers for Unconditioned Programs
The weakest pre-expectation semantics generalizes Dijkstra's original weakest precondition semantics to the setting of probabilistic programs. It was first introduced by [38] for fully probabilistic programs 2 with assertions (therein called tests) and then extended by [40] to incorporate nondeterminism.
To accommodate probabilities, the weakest pre-expectation semantics extends the classic weakest precondition semantics twofold. First, instead of being predicates over program states, pre-and Notations. In the remainder, we use bold fonts for constant expectations; e.g., 1 denotes the constant expectation λs.1. Given an expression E over program variables, we simply write E for the expectation that state s returns s (E). Given a Boolean expression G over program variables, we use [G] to denote the {0, 1}-valued expectation that returns 1 if s |= G and 0 otherwise. Finally, given expression E, program variable x, and expectation f , we write f [x/E] for the expectation that maps state s to f (s[x/s (E)]).
Having fixed the required notation, we present in Figure 3 (second column) the rules defining transformers wp and wlp. Transformer wlp differs from wp only in abort and while-loops. The action of the transformers on loops is given as the fixed point of an expectation transformer. To guarantee that such fixed points exist, we exploit the fact that the set of expectations E and E ≤1 form an ω-complete partial order (ω-cpo): expectations are ordered pointwise, i.e., f д if and only if f (s) ≤ д(s) for every state s ∈ S. The least upper bound of ω-chains is also defined pointwise, i.e., (sup n f n )(s) sup n f n (s) for any ω-chain f 1 f 2 . . . .
Throughout our presentation, we follow McIver and Morgan's notation and terminology for the (weakest precondition) semantics of probabilistic programs; e.g., we use symbols w(l)p for the transformers and refer to pre-and postconditions as pre-and postexpectations. In Kozen's original work, transformers wp[·] and wlp[·] are respectively denoted by · and [·], and represent (dual) modalities of a propositional dynamic logic [38] .
Program Termination. Since the termination behavior of a program is given by the probability that it establishes true, we can readily use transformer wp[·] to reason about program termination. It suffices to consider the weakest pre-expectation of the program w.r.t. postexpectation [true] = 1. Said otherwise, wp[c](1)(s) gives the termination probability of program c from state s. In particular, if the program terminates with probability 1, we say that it terminates almost surely.
Conditional Expectation Transformers
The pre-expectation of an unconditioned program c in initial state s is given by the expected value
of the postexpectation with respect to the distribution of final states c (s). If program c includes observations, we consider, instead, the conditional expected value to account for their effect. (Recall that the effect of an observation is to condition the distribution of program runs: runs violating the observation are blocked, while the probability of the unblocked runs is normalized.) This conditional expected value can be written as 4
where c (s) is the subdistribution of final states reached by unblocked runs only. This quotient must be interpreted in the same way as the quotient
Pr(B) encoding the conditional probability Pr(A|B), the only difference being that here we consider conditional expectations instead of mere conditional probabilities.
To extend the expectation transformer semantics to cpGCL, we proceed in two steps. First, we introduce the subsidiary transformer
which will capture the numerator and denominator of the above quotient. Then we define the conditional weakest pre-expectation cwp[c]( f ) of a cpGCL program c with respect to postexpectation f simply by
, 
Definition 4.1 (Conditional Expectation Transformers).
Given program c ∈ cpGCL and expectations f ∈ E and д ∈ E ≤1 , we let the conditional weakest pre-expectation cwp[c]( f ) of c with respect to f and the conditional weakest liberal pre-expectation cwlp[c](д) of c with respect to д be, respectively, defined as
where transformers
are defined by induction on the structure of c, following the rules in Figure 3 (third column), thoroughly discussed below. Figure 3 (third column). Let us briefly explain these rules. cwp [skip] behaves as the identity since skip has no effect. cwp[abort] maps any pair of postexpectations to the pair of constant pre-expectations (0, 1). Assignments induce a substitution on expectations, i.e., cwp[ Example 4.2. Consider again the goldfish-piranha problem from Section 2 and let us do the detailed calculations to establish Equation (2) . Throughout the calculations, we use c i−j fish to denote the fragment of program c fish from line i to line j.
From these calculations, we conclude that
. In words, the probability that f 1 = pir after running program c fish (from any initial state) is 2 /3.
Conditional Expectation of Loops
As demonstrated in the example above, reasoning about the outcome of loop-free programs consists mostly of syntactic reasoning. Reasoning about the outcome of loops involves, in contrast, fixed points. To circumvent this, we now study a proof rule based on invariants. As a first step to state the proof rule, we need to introduce the characteristic functional of a loop, which intuitively captures the effect of cwp on one iteration. 
be the characteristic functional of loop while (G) {c} with respect to postexpectations ( f , д).
Observe that under this definition, the action of transformers cw(l)p on loops can be recast as
Now we can present our proof rule to determine cwp[while (G) {c}]( f , д). The rule rests on the presence of an invariant in E × E ≤1 , parameterized by the set of natural numbers. That is, let I n ∈ E × E ≤1 for all n ≥ 0 and let G be the characteristic functional of while (G) {c} with respect to postexpectations ( f , д) ∈ E × E ≤1 . The rule then reads
If I n satisfies the rule premise, we say that it is an ω-invariant of the loop with respect to postexpectations ( f , д). Intuitively, an ω-invariant I n can be interpreted as a sequence of approximations to cwp[while (G) {c}]( f , д); the larger the n, the more accurate the approximation becomes. In particular, for each n, I n coincides with the exact semantics cwp[while (G) {c}]( f , д) of the loop in all initial states for which the loop terminates after at most n iterations. In general, the first component of an ω-invariant is increasing with respect to n, while the second component is decreasing (see the proof of Theorem 4.5). By the Monotone Sequence Theorem, 6 their limits always exist, which guarantees that term lim n→∞ I n in the conclusion of the rule is well defined.
Example 4.4.
To illustrate the use of our proof rule, consider the following problem: assume Alice repeatedly flips three fair coins until all three turn tails (symbolize ). What is the probability that she finishes after exactly N trials if in all unsuccessful trials she observed at least one tails?
The problem can be modeled by the program where
The pre-expectation cwp[c tails ]([m = N ]) readily gives the desired probability. The crux for determining this pre-expectation is showing that 
, and we conclude that Alice observes three tails after (exactly) N trials with probability
As a sanity check, we can use the geometric series to verify that N ≥1 Throughout the calculations, we write body for the loop body and G for the observation condition. We then have
Intuitively, we can justify the last equality above because the only outcome of the coin flips that violates the observation is when the three coins turn heads, and each (nonviolating) outcome occurs with probability 1 8 . Formally, this step requires a repeated unfolding of cwp and some straightforward simplifications.
The two requirements G(0, 1) = I 0 and G(I n ) = I n+1 on ω-invariant I n are discharged by the following calculations:
In the derivation of G(I n ) = I n+1 , the second equality holds because out of the seven outcomes of the coin flips different from ( , , ), one satisfies ¬G and the remaining six satisfy G.
Rule [ω-cwp-while] can be modified to provide an approximation-rather than an exact characterization-of the behavior of loops. The new rule relies on the presence of a single-not parameterized-invariant I ∈ E × E ≤1 and is stated using the order relation over pairs of expectations " × ", which compels an increasing order on the first component of pairs and a decreasing order on the second component, i.e., ( f , д) × ( f , д ) if and only if f f and д д . The rule reads
where G is the characteristic functional of while (G) {c} with respect to postexpectations
The rule is particularly useful because it allows bounding from above the conditional pre-expectation of programs with loops; in particular, by taking д = 1, it allows bounding from above the conditional pre-expectation cwp[while (G) {c}]( f ).
We now establish the formal validity of the introduced rules. Besides being sound, both proof rules [ω-cwp-while] and [cwp-while] are complete, in the sense that there always exists an invariant that allows providing the exact semantics of the loop at hand by means of the rules. Proof. Recall that cwp[while (G) {c}]( f , д) = lfp , (G) and let us start with rule [ω-cwpwhile]. To establish the soundness of the rule, we exploit first the continuity of G (which follows from the continuity of cwp established in Lemma A.2) to conclude that lfp , (G) can be obtained by fixed-point iteration from (0, 1). That is, lfp , (G) = sup n G n (0, 1), where G n denotes the composition of G with itself n times. By a standard result on ω-cpos, G n (0, 1) is monotonic 7 with respect to n and hence sup n G n (0, 1) = lim n→∞ G n (0, 1) by the Monotone Sequence Theorem. 6 To conclude the soundness proof, it is only left to show that G n+1 (0, 1) = I n , which can be established from the rule premise, by induction on n. The completeness of the rule readily follows from taking
Consider now rule [cwp-while]. The soundness of the rule follows from a straightforward application of Park's Lemma, 8 which says that if G(I) × I, then lfp , (G) × I. The completeness of the rule follows by taking I = lfp , (G).
To conclude our study of the proof rules for loops, we highlight that rule [ω-cwp-while] can be readily adapted to reason about partial program correctness. It suffices to adjust the initial condition for the iteration of the characteristic functional and consider, instead, its liberal version, i.e.,
The argument for ensuring the existence of lim n→∞ I n is analogous to that in rule [ω-cwp-while], the only difference being that an ω-invariant I n satisfying the premises of rule [ω-cwlp-while] is decreasing in both its components, instead of increasing in the first and decreasing in the second. The liberal version of rule [cwp-while] also remains valid, i.e.,
but it turns out to be useless as it does not enable bounding the conditional liberal pre-expectations of programs with loops. (Lower bounds on both the numerator and denominator of a fraction yield no possible bound for the fraction.)
Basic Properties of Conditional Expectation Transformers
We next investigate some fundamental properties of the expectation transformer semantics of cpGCL. We begin presenting a decomposition result about cw(l)p. Concretely, we show that the two components of transformer cwp ( cwlp, respectively) are independent. The transformer cwp can, indeed, be decoupled as the product wp × wlp ( wlp × wlp, respectively). To make this claim precise, we need first to extend transformer w(l)p to cpGCL; we define
The decomposition result of cw(l)p is then formalized as follows:
Proof. By induction on the structure of c. See Appendix A.1 for details.
This decomposition result readily gives an alternative characterization of transformers cw(l)p, namely,
and supports the argument that we employed to extend the expectation transformer semantics to conditioned programs: as an immediate corollary, one can prove that the cwp semantics is a conservative extension of the wp semantics (to conditioned programs). The same result applies to the liberal version of the semantics.
Theorem 4.7 (Compatibility with the w(l)p Semantics).
For an unconditioned program c ∈ cpGCL, f ∈ E, and д ∈ E ≤1 ,
Proof. From the alternative characterization of transformers cw(l)p (Equation (3)) and the fact that for an unconditioned program c, wlp[c](1) = 1 [38] .
This means that when applying the cwp semantics to a probabilistic program without observe statements, the first component of the semantics equals the wp semantics of McIver and Morgan. This holds for all programs, including the possibly diverging ones. In the same vein, the semantics of R2 [42] can be shown to be a conservative extension for certainly terminating probabilistic programs.
Transformer w(l)p enjoys appealing algebraic properties such as monotonicity and (sub-) linearity [38] . These properties remain valid for transformer cw(l)p.
Lemma 4.8 (Basic Properties of cw(l)p).
For every c ∈ cpGCL with at least one feasible execution (from every initial state), postexpectations f , f ∈ E, д, д ∈ E ≤1 , and nonnegative real constants α, α ,
Preserv. of 0, 1:
Proof. In view of Equation (3), monotonicity and (sub-)linearity are inherited from transformer w(l)p; duality follows from the more general property wlp [c] 
, by taking д = 1−д; preservation of 0 is also inherited from wp; and preservation of 1 is immediate.
Let us briefly discuss these properties. Monotonicity is an inherent property of the transformers; it guarantees, e.g., that the probability that a program establishes some property Q is at most the probability that it establishes property, say, Q whenever Q implies Q . Linearity is relevant because it allows for modular reasoning about the specification of programs. Duality says that we can reason about partial program correctness using transformer cwp. It also simplifies our proof effort since most properties about cwlp can be established by a direct dualization argument; for instance, the preservation of 1 (by cwlp) can be derived by dualization from the preservation of 0 (by cwp). Preservation of 0 says that the probability that a program establishes false is zero; it is the probabilistic counterpart of the so-called law of excluded miracle [19] . Finally, preservation of 1 says that almost surely a program either terminates (i.e., establishes true) or diverges.
These properties are shared by transformers w(l)p and cw(l)p. There are, however, two properties that do not carry over from w(l)p to cw(l)p, namely, continuity and the ability to establish a contextual equivalence. Continuity is an important semantic feature because, loosely speaking, it guarantees that the behavior of a loop coincides with the limit behavior of its finite approximations. Formally, we define the n-unrolling while n (G) {c} of a loop by
and continuity of, e.g., cwp would ensure that
For an infeasible loop, however, this equality breaks down. To illustrate this phenomenon, consider the loop
and let body denote its body. After some calculations, we obtain
is not well defined because the loop is infeasible from s, while sup n cwp[while n (x = 1) {body}]( f )(s) is well defined and gives 0.
The second property that does not carry over from w(l)p to cw(l)p is the ability to establish a contextual equivalence. For unconditioned programs, the notion of semantic equivalence induced by wp allows for a safe interchangeability of equivalent programs. Formally, if
. Intuitively, this holds because the action of wp on a compound program is completely determined by its action on the subprograms. In the general case, this compositionality breaks down for transformer cwp though. As a consequence, the transformer does not induce a contextual equivalence for conditioned programs. To see this, consider the programs
, both programs are easily distinguished, e.g., by postcon-
. Despite this limitation, we believe that cwp equivalence remains a useful notion as it guarantees that cwp-equivalent programs cannot be distinguished by events: two cwp-equivalent programs assign the exact same probability to any event (or Boolean postcondition).
A better-behaved transformer is cwp. Its definition is completely compositional-the first principle of the denotational semantics-and it induces a contextual equivalence between conditioned programs. It is able to distinguish, for instance, the two programs above since
We conclude this section discussing some alternative approaches for providing an expectation transformer semantics to conditioned programs. As mentioned before, a notable consequence of Lemma 4.6 is that we can rewrite our transformers cw(l)p as in Equation (3) . There, both cwp[c]( f ) and cwlp[c](д) are normalized with respect to wlp[c](1), the probability that c either diverges or passes all observations. An alternative approach is to normalize using wp instead of wlp, yielding the pair of transformers
For the transformer on the right, the denominator wp[c](1)(s) may be smaller than the numerator wlp[c](д)(s) for some state s ∈ S. This leads to probabilities exceeding one. The transformer on the left normalizes with respect to the terminating executions (that pass all observations). This is a fully reasonable choice for certainly terminating programs (i.e., programs that have no diverging runs) or almost surely terminating programs (i.e., programs whose divergent behaviors have probability mass zero). This is the approach taken in the formal semantics of the probabilistic programming language R2 [28, 42] , which aims at applications like image computations that typically are certainly terminating programs. 9 A noteworthy consequence of adopting this transformer is that observe (G) is equivalent to while (¬G) {skip} [28] . This is not the case when normalizing w.r.t. all (including the possibly diverging) program behaviors as is discussed in detail in Section 7.
Example 4.9. The pair of transformers discussed above together with cwp and cwlp yield, overall, four different semantic approaches for conditioned programs. Let us briefly compare these alternatives by means of a concrete program,
Program c tosses a fair coin and according to the outcome either diverges or tosses a fair coin twice, and observes at least once heads. If we measure the probability that the outcome of the last coin toss was heads according to each of the four transformers, we obtain
As mentioned before, the last transformer is not meaningful as it results in a value-in this case: a "probability"-exceeding one. Our cwp transformer (the leftmost above) yields that the probability that y = after executing c while passing statement observe (x = ∨ y = ) is 2 7 . Intuitively, this can be seen as follows. The right (nondiverging) branch admits four runs, three of which are valid. For the sake of argument, assume the left branch has four runs as well, all diverging. Their total probability mass is 1 2 , the probability to abort. Seven out of the total eight runs are valid. As in total two runs establish the condition [y = ], we obtain 2 7 . As shown before, this is a conservative and simple extension of the wp semantics to conditioned programs. For the R2 semantics (the third transformer above), this desired result does not hold. Intuitively, the R2 approach ignores the diverging branch. Then there are three (out of four) feasible runs, two of which establish [y = ]. This yields 2 3 . Note that for almost surely terminating programs, the R2 approach and our semantics coincide.
OPERATIONAL SEMANTICS
As a next step, we investigate the relationship between the expectation transformer semantics of Section 4 and an operational interpretation of cpGCL programs. Inspired by [25] , a small-step operational semantics for cpGCL is defined where programs are interpreted as Markov chains. We then prove that conditional weakest pre-expectations correspond to conditional expected rewards in these Markov chains. We first present the intuition in an informal manner and then define the necessary notion (such as paths and expected rewards) on Markov chains. This is followed by the detailed operational semantics and the correspondence result.
Informal Account
To each program and initial state we associate a Markov chain whose evolution fully characterizes the possible program executions. Intuitively, a Markov chain is a transition system where the successor of a state is chosen according to a probability distribution, and this distribution depends only on the current state (memoryless property). In our case, the states of the Markov chain represent different points of the program execution; they are of the form c, s , where c represents the program fragment left to execute and s the program state at that point. The Markov chain contains, additionally, two distinguished states and sink . The state models the violation of an observation and sink models the program termination, either successful or due to a violated observation. Each successful (i.e., unblocked) terminating run of the program corresponds to a path (along states) of the Markov chain, and the probability of the run corresponds to the probability of the path in the Markov chain.
For a program c ∈ cpGCL and an initial state s ∈ S, the general structure of the Markov chain is depicted in Figure 4 . A program run either (a) terminates successfully in a terminal state of the form ↓, s for some s ∈ S (symbol "↓"
indicates that there is nothing left to execute, and s is the final state of the run), or (b) terminates due to a false observation, transitioning to state , or (c) diverges while passing all observations, modeled by an infinite path never reaching sink .
In Figure 4 , squiggly arrows indicate reaching certain states via possibly multiple paths and intermediate states; clouds indicate sets of states. Note that the sets of paths that eventually reach , eventually reach a terminal state ↓, · , or diverge are pairwise disjoint.
To be able to relate this operational program model to our expectation transformer semantics, we must incorporate postexpectations in the model. We do so by adding (real-valued) rewards to the states of the Markov chain. All states will have reward zero, except for the (terminal) states of the form ↓, s , whose reward will be the value of the postexpectation in s . The program outcome (with respect to a given postexpectation or reward over final states) then corresponds to the so-called conditional expected reward to reach state sink , conditioned on the fact that is avoided. Our correspondence result will state that this agrees with the semantics as defined by the expectation transformer cwp. 
Preliminaries on Markov Chains
We next recall some preliminaries about Markov chains necessary to formalize the outlined operational model. Let D (A) denote the set of probability distributions μ : A → [0, 1] over a countable set A, where a ∈A μ (a) = 1.
Definition 5.1 (Markov Chain).
A Markov chain is a tuple M = (Σ, σ I , P) with a countable set of states Σ, an initial state σ I ∈ Σ, and a transition probability function P : Σ → D(Σ).
A path of the Markov chain M is an infinite sequence of states π = σ 0 σ 1 σ 2 . . . , where σ i ∈ Σ, σ 0 = σ I , and P (σ i )(σ i+1 ) > 0. The transition probability function P induces a probability measure
be the set of all paths that visit a target state in T . It follows by simple arguments that ♦T is measurable. Let Pr M (♦T ) denote the probability of eventually reaching a state in T from the initial state σ I in Markov chain M. Analogously, for the set of undesired states U ⊆ Σ, let
be the set of paths that never visit a state in U ; Pr M (¬♦ U ) is the probability of never visiting a state in U . In our operational program interpretation, sink plays the role of the (single) target state, while represents the (single) undesired state. For the sake of succinctness, we write ♦ sink and ¬ ♦ for ♦ { sink } and ¬ ♦ { }, respectively.
In order to be able to reason about expectations in states-after all, we are interested in capturing weakest pre-expectations-we equip Markov chains with a reward function r : Σ → R ≥0 that associates nonnegative rewards to the Markov chain states. Note that a Markov chain together with a reward function is also referred to as Markov reward chain. For a finite prefixπ = s 0 . . . s n of a path, let r (π ) n−1 i=0 r (s i ) be the cumulative reward ofπ . Here, it is assumed that a reward is "earned" upon leaving a state. The reward of the last state s n ofπ thus is not taken into account. Let rv(♦T ) be the random variable that assigns to each path π in M the reward r (π ) of the shortest prefixπ of π such that the last state inπ belongs to T . We have rv(♦T )(π ) = ∞ whenever π ♦T . Let ER M (♦T ) be the expectation of the random variable rv(♦T ) for the Markov chain M when starting in its initial state. If Pr(♦T ) < 1, then this expectation is zero.
thus represents the expected reward upon reaching (a target state in) T in M from its starting state. From the proof of measurability of the set ♦T [5, Chapter 10.1], we have
whereπ = σ 0 . . . σ n is the shortest prefix of π such that σ n ∈ T and Pr M (π ) is the probability of the finite pathπ defined as P (σ 0 )(σ 1 ) · · · · · P(σ n−1 )(σ n ). In a similar way, let rv(♦T ∩ ¬♦ U ) be the random variable that is defined as rv(♦T ) with the additional constraint that on the shortest prefix until reaching T no state in U is visited. Then, ER M (♦T ∩ ¬♦ U ) is the expected value of this random variable.
To understand the role of rewards in the operational semantics, consider an unconditioned program. Let us discuss the expected reward ER (♦ sink ) upon reaching sink . Assume that the program almost surely terminates; that is, Pr(♦ sink ) equals one. All terminating runs of the program are represented by paths reaching sink (see Figure 4) . The cumulative reward of such paths is the value of the postexpectation in the final state of the runs (recall that terminal states are the only ones to collect positive reward, conveyed-precisely-by the postexpectation). Then, ER (♦ sink ) gives the average of the postexpectation over the set of final states, weighted according to the probability of reaching each of these final states. As shown in [25] , this is exactly the effect of transformer wp on unconditioned programs.
To extend this result to programs with observe statements, we consider conditional expected rewards. Let CER M (♦T | ¬♦ U ) be the expectation of random variable rv(♦T ) with respect to the conditional probability measure
Intuitively speaking, CER M (♦T | ¬♦ U ) is the conditional expected reward to reach T while avoiding U .
Definition 5.2 (Conditional Expected Reward).
Given a Markov chain M = (Σ, σ I , P), a reward function r : Σ → R ≥0 , and sets of states T , U ⊆ Σ, the conditional expected reward to reach T while avoiding U is defined as
Both ordinary and conditional expected rewards admit a liberal version to account for the cases where the set of target states is not reached with probability one. For a reward function r : S → [0, 1], they are defined as
These liberal variants will be useful for reasoning about programs that do not terminate with probability one.
Operational Markov Reward Chain of Programs
We have all the necessary ingredients to introduce our operational model of programs in detail.
Formally, this operational model is given in terms of what we call operational Markov reward chains (OMRCs), as sketched in Figure 4 .
Definition 5.3 (Operational Markov Reward Chain). The operational Markov reward chain R
f s c of program c ∈ cpGCL in state s ∈ S with respect to postexpectation f ∈ E is defined as follows:
• The set of states of R • The initial state of R f s c is c, s .
• The transition probability function of R f s c is defined by the rules in Figure 5 .
• The reward function r of of R f s c is defined as r (σ ) f (s ) if σ = ↓, s for some s ∈ S and r (σ ) 0 otherwise.
The conditional (liberal) expected outcome of program c with respect to postexpectation f ∈ E is given by the conditional (liberal) expected reward 
Except for the transition function, all elements of the OMRCs were already sketched in Section 5.1. The rules defining the transition function are rather straightforward. Let us briefly discuss them. skip terminates successfully (recall that "↓" indicates a terminating state). x := E updates the program state and terminates successfully. abort self-loops, i.e., diverges. observe (G) either terminates successfully or evolves into , depending on the valuation of the guard. Terminal states and evolve into sink , which, once reached, is never left. ite (G) {c 1 } {c 2 } transitions to a state containing either of its branches, according to the valuation of the guard. {c 1 } [p] {c 2 } transitions with probability p to a state executing c 1 and with probability 1−p to a state executing c 2 . while (G) {c} either terminates successfully or unfolds its body once, depending on the valuation of the guard. Finally, for the sequential composition c 1 ; c 2 , we (recursively) apply one transition step in c 1 and "append" the reachable states with c 2 . If c 1 terminates successfully in one step, we continue the execution with c 2 , and if c 1 transitions to in one step (i.e., c 1 is an observation that is violated in the state at hand), we remain in state .
Example 5.4. To illustrate the application of these rules, we now sketch the full-fledged OMRC of program c fish from Section 2 (see Figure 1) . The Markov chain is depicted in Figure 6 . Observe that in contrast to the simplified model given in Section 2 ( Figure 2 ), this OMRC (1) tags states with the program fragment left to execute instead of with the current program line. This is consistent with standard small-step semantics of imperative programs and arises because it is convenient that states contain all the necessary information to determine their immediate successors (memoryless property of Markov chains); (2) collects the undesired state and all terminal states ↓, · into the absorbing state sink . This is just for convenience so that when defining the program outcome, our set of target states is just the singleton { sink }; (3) contains more "intermediate" states where only the program fragment left to execute is updated (the program state remains untouched), e.g., upon probabilistic choices. This is basically a design decision related to the granularity that we have chosen for our computational steps. Intermediate computation states are represented by boxes, whose topmost row contains the program fragment left to execute (we display only its initial instruction) and the bottommost row contains the program state at that point (from left to right, the value of variables f 1 , f 2 , and rem). When a transition occurs with probability one, we omit the probability in the respective edge. Only one state of the Markov chain has positive reward (of one), which is depicted on one side of the state, using a gray box. Figure 6 is associated to postexpectation [f 1 = pir]. Terminal state ↓, s with s = f 1 → pir, f 2 → pir, rem → pir is the only one that establishes the postexpectation and has thus reward 1 (signaled alongside within a gray box); all the remaining states of the Markov chain have reward 0. The conditional expected reward
over this Markov chain, abbreviated M, yields, then, the probability that program c fish establishes f 1 = pir from state s. Let us determine concrete values for the numerator and denominator above. As for the numerator, the set ♦sink ∩ ¬♦ contains three paths, but only two of them-the ones traversing ↓, s -have positive cumulated reward, of 1; these two paths each have probability 1 4 . As for the denominator, set ¬ ♦ contains exactly the same three paths as ♦sink ∩ ¬♦ , since the program has no diverging run. Their overall probability is 1 /2 · 1 /2 + 1 /2 · ( 1 /2 + 1 /2). This yields
= 2 3 and puts on formal basis the informal calculations in Section 2.1 to determine the probability that program c fish establishes f 1 = pir.
In the above example, the obtained OMRC is finite. In general, this is not necessarily the case. Consider, for instance, the program b := true; n := 0; while (b) {b := true [p] false; n := n + 1} that simulates a geometric distribution. One can show that the program terminates with probability 1. However, its associated OMRC is countably infinite since n can take arbitrarily large values.
A simple observation on the structure of the OMRCs allows simplifying the definition of program outcomes. By definition, the conditional (liberal) expected outcome C(L)ER
gives the subset of ♦ sink with paths representing unblocked (terminating) runs, which are, in effect, the only ones with positive cumulated reward. Therefore, we can safely replace ♦ sink ∩ ¬ ♦ with ♦ sink in the reward above. This yields the alternative characterization for the conditional outcome of programs
which we will shortly use to establish a correspondence theorem between our two semantic models.
Correspondence Theorem
We now investigate the connection between the operational semantics of conditioned probabilistic programs with the expectation transformer semantics of Section 4. We start with some auxiliary results. The first result establishes a relation between (liberal) expected rewards upon reaching sink and weakest (liberal) pre-expectations.
Lemma 5.5. For program c ∈ cpGCL, state s ∈ S, and expectations f ∈ E, д ∈ E ≤1 ,
, and
Proof. By induction on the structure of c; see Appendix A.4 for details.
The next result states that the probability of never visiting coincides with the weakest liberal pre-expectation of postexpectation 1. 
Conditioning in Probabilistic Programming 4:27
Proof. A direct inspection of Figure 4 reveals that paths in ¬ ♦ avoiding state can be classified into two (disjoint) categories. Either (1) they represent a successful program run and visit a terminal state ↓, s for some s ∈ S, or (2) they represent a diverging run. The set of "(a)-paths" is just ♦T for T = { ↓, s | s ∈ S}, while the set of "(b)-paths" is ¬ ♦sink , since paths reaching sink are exactly those that represent terminating runs. Thus,
Observe now that every terminal state (in T ) evolves with probability one into sink and the remaining paths reaching sink have cumulated reward zero (because they reach sink via ). Then, by assigning reward one to terminal states and reward zero to all other states, we can recast the probability of reaching a terminal state as an expected reward, i.e., We now have all prerequisites to present the main result of this section, namely, the correspondence between the operational and expectation transformer semantics of cpGCL programs. It turns out that the conditional weakest pre-expectation cwp[c]( f )(s) coincides with the conditional expected reward in the OMRC R f s c of terminating (i.e., reaching sink ) while never violating an observation (i.e., avoiding ).
Pr

Overall, this yields Pr
Theorem 5.7 (Correspondence Theorem). For program c ∈ cpGCL, state s ∈ S, and expectations
Proof. Consider the first equation. As shown below, we can readily transform the left-hand side into the right-hand side by applying first Equation (4), then Lemmas 5.5 and 5.6, and finally Equation (3):
The proof of the second equation is similar.
Theorem 5.7 extends a result by [25] , who established a connection between an operational and expectation transformer semantics for unconditioned probabilistic programs. In contrast to our programming model, theirs also includes nondeterminism. We thoroughly treat the interaction between nondeterminism and conditioning in the next section.
NONDETERMINISM
In this section, we investigate the extension of the programming language and its previously described semantics with (bounded) nondeterminism. One of the primary goals of this article is to extend the wp semantics by McIver et al. [40, 41] with conditioning. Demonic nondeterminism plays a key role in their work, and we therefore are interested in studying the interplay between conditioning and this form of nondeterminism. Another motivation is that abstraction of program variables in probabilistic programs typically gives rise to (demonic) nondeterminism. Resulting abstract programs in our setting thus exhibit conditioning as well as nondeterminism, and the question at stake is how to treat this from a semantic point of view. Along the lines of McIver et al. and Dijkstra, this article considers demonic nondeterminism. We will show that Markov decision processes [46] , a generalization of Markov chains featuring nondeterminism, provide a natural interpretation for conditioned nondeterministic programs. Expected rewards and the like are defined subject to a given resolution of the nondeterminism in the MDP, and the demonic nature gives naturally rise to taking the infimum over all possible resolutions. As a second result, we show that the expectation transformer semantics, on the contrary, is problematic in the presence of both conditioning and nondeterminism: our impossibility result asserts that there is no possible (inductive) extension of our conditional expectation transformer semantics that accounts also for nondeterministic programs.
Nondeterministic Programs
To model nondeterministic programs, we extend the cpGCL language with a binary nondeterministic choice construct, i.e., C ::= . . . | {C} {C}, leading to the so-called nondeterministic cpGCL language, abbreviated cpGCL . Given programs c 1 and c 2 , statement {c 1 } {c 2 } represents a nondeterministic choice between c 1 and c 2 . For the interpretation of a nondeterministic program, we follow McIver and Morgan [40] and assume a demonic model: for each individual postexpectation (and initial program state), the nondeterministic choices along the program execution are resolved by an adversary trying to minimize the resulting conditional weakest pre-expectation or conditional expected reward. To clarify this, consider, for instance, the program below that first sets variable x to either 0 or 1, with probability If we now want to determine the probability that x = 0 after the program execution, the demonic interpretation of nondeterminism yields that this probability is zero, as the adversary will always prefer to reset the value of x to 1 because the other option would result in a greater probability, i.e., 1 /2.
As we have just illustrated, the demonic model of nondeterminism provides the tightest lower bound that one can guarantee for a program's pre-expectation. The decision of adopting this model is not arbitrary: it constitutes the probabilistic counterpart of Dijkstra's original interpretation
of nondeterminism for ordinary sequential programs [19] .
Operational Semantics
Nondeterministic programs in cpGCL are interpreted as Markov decision processes. Markov decision processes can be seen as a generalization of Markov chains, where to evolve from a given state σ , we first make a nondeterministic choice among the so-called actions enabled in σ , and then, given σ and the selected action, we proceed with a probabilistic choice of the successor state. Formally, we define a function Act that maps a state σ to a set Act (σ ) of enabled actions in state σ . The transition function is then a function mapping pairs (σ , α ) to distributions over states, for α ∈ Act (σ ).
Definition 6.1 (Markov Decision Process).
A Markov decision process (MDP for short) is a tuple R = (Σ, σ I , Act, P), where Σ is a countable set of states, σ I ∈ Σ is the initial state, Act is a function mapping each state σ ∈ Σ to the set of enabled actions in σ 10 , and P :
To clarify the role of actions in MDPs, consider our operational interpretation of cpGCL programs. It will contain three possible actions:
• left and right, which are the ones enabled in states representing a nondeterministic choice (i.e., states of the form {c 1 } {c 2 }, s ). left represents taking the left branch of the nondeterministic choice (i.e., executing c 1 ), whereas right represents taking the right branch (i.e., executing c 2 ); and • default, which is the default action enabled for all other states.
In general, the evolution of an MDP is dictated by a so-called adversary (aka: scheduler) that resolves the nondeterministic choices. The decision of adversaries may depend on the sequence of states visited so far (i.e., on the history); they are thus partial functions S mapping finite state sequences onto actions such that S(σ 0 . . . σ n ) ∈ Act (σ n ) for every finite path σ 0 . . . σ n in the domain of S. In our operational model of cpGCL programs, adversaries will basically decide upon every occurrence of a nondeterministic choice whether to take the left or right branch (possibly depending on the sequence of program states visited thus far).
Given an adversary, the evolution of an MDP is completely probabilistic. In effect, every adversary induces a Markov chain. This allows readily extending the notion of expected rewards from Markov chains to MDPs: one basically defines the expected reward of an MDP as the infimum over the expected reward of all possible induced Markov chains. Taking the infimum corresponds to demonic nondeterminism as this amounts to minimizing the expected reward. In the case of conditional rewards, this gives
where Adv(R) is the set of all adversaries of MDP R and R S is the Markov chain induced by adversary S in R. This corresponds to the conditional reward that the MDP can certainly guarantee, regardless of which choices are made by the adversary to resolve the nondeterminism. This corresponds to demonic nondeterminism. We now have all the prerequisites to define the operational semantics of nondeterministic programs. The operational semantics of nondeterministic programs in cpGCL follows in a similar manner to that of purely probabilistic programs in cpGCL (see Definition 5.3), the only difference being that now the model for programs is MDPs rather than MCs. The set of actions of the operational MDP of programs is as previously described (see paragraph below Definition 6.1). The transition function is defined by the set of rules in Figure 5 , plus the following pair of rules to handle nondeterministic choices:
For example, rule [non-det-l] should be read as follows: being in state {c 1 } {c 2 }, s and upon the (nondeterministic) election of action left, evolve into state c 1 , s with probability one. The conditional (liberal) expected outcome of a nondeterministic program c ∈ cpGCL with respect to postexpectation f ∈ E and initial state s ∈ S is given by the conditional (liberal) expected reward
, 10 For technical reasons, we require that Act (σ ) ∅ for every state σ ∈ Σ. where with probability p either 5 or 2 is assigned nondeterministically to x, and with probability 1−p, exactly 2 is assigned; after that we observe that x > 3. The operational model of the program is depicted in Figure 7 . We are interested in computing the expected value of x and we consider thus the MDP R x s c nondet . The MDP admits two adversaries; in state σ = {x := 5} {x := 2}; observe (x > 3), s , one adversary selects action left and the other, action right. Consider the former adversary. In the induced MC, the only path accumulating positive reward is the path π going from the initial state to the sink state through σ , and there taking action left. For this path we have r (π ) = 5 and Pr(π ) = p; this gives an expected reward of 5 · p. The overall probability of not reaching is also p. The conditional expected reward of eventually reaching sink given that is not reached is hence 5·p p = 5. Consider now the latter adversary selecting action right in state σ . In this case, there is no path having positive cumulated reward in the induced MC, yielding an expected reward of 0. The probability of not reaching is also 0. The program is therefore infeasible and its outcome is not well defined.
Expectation Transformer Semantics
We now investigate the problems that occur when trying to provide an expectation transformer semantics for nondeterministic programs with conditioning. First, we show that we cannot simply extend the table in Figure 3 for nondeterministic programs. Thereafter, we provide a more general impossibility result.
Impossibility of an Inductive Extension of cwp to Nondeterministic Programs.
We argue that it is not possible to extend the rules for cwp given in Figure 3 
and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1; a schematic depiction of its operational MDP R x s c α is given in Figure 8 . Assume now (for the purpose of a contraposition) that we can extend the rules in Figure 3 , such that we have a rule for nondeterministic programs for which Theorem 5.7 remains valid. Then there exists some ( f , д) such that
and since Theorem 5.7 is supposed to remain valid, for any state s, 
Notice that in the nondeterministic choice of c 5 , the left branch was preferred in order to minimize the conditional expected reward of x after execution of c 5 .
Let α = 1 2 . We can now compute cwp for the entire program c α :
By Theorem 5.7, we obtain
Using f = 4 /3 and by recalling Equation (5), we establish
Observe that cwp[c 5 ](x, 1) is (as it should be) independent of α and that in the nondeterministic choice at c 5 the right branch was preferred so as to minimize the conditional expected reward of x after execution of c α . Now let α = 3 /4. Again, we derive the cwp of the entire program c α by
But we have
This contradicts the assumption that Theorem 5.7 holds. Thus, the assumption that we can assign a unique pair ( f , д) to cwp[c 5 ](x, 1), independent of the context that the program c 5 is put into, was wrong and thus we cannot extend the rules for cwp to nondeterministic programs.
Nonexistence of Inductive Conditional Weakest Pre-Expectation Transformers.
We now argue why (under mild assumptions) it is not possible at all to come up with a denotational semantics in the style of conditional pre-expectation transformers (CPETs for short) for full cpGCL. To show this, it suffices to consider a simple fragment of cpGCL containing only assignments, observations, and probabilistic and nondeterministic choices. Let x be the only program variable that can be written or read in this fragment. We denote this fragment by cpGCL − . Assume D is some appropriate domain for representing conditional expectations of the program variable x and let · : D → R ∪ {⊥} be an interpretation function such that for any d ∈ D we have that d is equal to the (possibly undefined) conditional expected value of x with respect to some fixed initial state s 0 .
Definition 6.3 (Inductive CPETs).
A CPET is a function cwp * : cpGCL − → D such that for any
and some function N :
where
This definition requires that the conditional pre-expectation of {c 1 } [p] {c 2 } is determined only by the conditional pre-expectation of c 1 , the conditional pre-expectation of c 2 , and the probability p. Furthermore, the above definition requires that the conditional pre-expectation of {c 1 } {c 2 } is determined by the conditional pre-expectation of c 1 and the conditional pre-expectation of c 2 only. Consequently, the nondeterministic choice can be resolved by replacing it either by c 1 or c 2 , which is the traditional assumption in the field of program refinement [4] . Notice that these assumptions are crucial to our impossibility result.
As we assume a fixed initial state and a fixed postexpectation, the nondeterministic choice turns out to be deterministic once the pre-expectations of c 1 and c 2 are known. Under the above assumptions (which do apply to the wp and wlp transformers), we claim: Theorem 6.4. There exists no inductive CPET.
Proof. The proof goes by contraposition and basically shows that nondeterministic choices cannot be resolved without taking the context of a program into account. In particular, we show that the nondeterministic choice in subprogram c 5 of program c α from Section 6.3.1 has to be resolved in different ways depending on whether c 5 stands alone or is put into context
For the proof, reconsider therefore the program c α from Section 6.3.1 and choose α = 1 /2. Assume there exists an inductive CPET cwp * over some appropriate domain D. Then,
By Definition 6.3, cwp * being inductive requires the existence of a function K , such that
In addition, there must be an N with
Since c 4 is a probabilistic choice between an infeasible branch and c 2.2 , the expected value for x has to be rescaled to the feasible branch. Hence, cwp * [c 4 ] = 2.2, whereas cwp * [c 2 ] = 2. Thus:
.
As nondeterministic choice is demonic, we have
since by Definition 6.3, N can only select either d 2 
Since 1.4 < 1.5, the second option should be preferred by a demonic adversary. This, however, requires that
Together with the equality in Equation (7) we get
. This contradicts the inequality in Equation (6).
This result is related to the fact that for minimizing conditional (reachability) probabilities in RMDPs positional, i.e., history independent, adversaries are insufficient [2] . Intuitively speaking, if a history-dependent adversary is required, this necessitates the inductive definition of cwp * to take the context of a statement (if any) into account. This conflicts with the principle of an inductive definition.
APPLICATIONS
In this section, we study some applications that make use of our semantics to analyze conditioned probabilistic programs. First, we present a program transformation that hoists observe statements all the way up of programs delivering an observe-free program equivalent to the original. Second, we present a technique based on rejection sampling that simulates the observe statements of a program by enclosing (a slightly modified version of) the program in a global loop. These two transformations show that observe statements are, to some degree, syntactic sugar. Lastly, we show that loops with no information flow across iterations can be substituted by their mere body, followed by a conditioning on the loop guard.
Hoisting Observations
We introduce a semantics-preserving transformation for removing observations from conditioned probabilistic programs and establish its correctness using the expectation transformer semantics from Section 4. Intuitively, the program transformation "hoists" the observe statements and along the way updates the probabilities of the probabilistic choices. Given program c, the transformation delivers a semantically equivalent observe-free programĉ and-as a side product-an expectation h ∈ E ≤1 that captures the probability of the original program c to establish all observations. To illustrate this, reconsider program c fish modeling our "goldfish-piranha" problem (see Section 2). The transformation yields programĉ fish on the right, where
f 2 := pir;
, together with the expectationĥ = 3 /4. The probability that f 1 = pir inĉ fish is 2 /3, which agrees with the probability in the original program; see Example 4.2.
Notice that the programs yielded by this transformation belong to a slightly more general class of probabilistic programs, namely, those in which the probabilities in the probabilistic choices may depend on the current program state (recall the remark from page 9). These mappings from program states to probabilities may in some cases even be noncomputable. This is due to the fact that the rule for while-loops involves a greatest fixed-point construct, which may then enter the probability of a probabilistic choice by the according rule.
To apply the transformation to a program c, we need to determine T (c, 1), which gives the semantically equivalent programĉ and the expectationĥ. The transformation T is defined in Figure 9 and works by inductively computing the weakest pre-expectation that guarantees the establishment of all observe statements and updating the probability parameter of probabilistic choices so that the pre-expectations of their branches are established in accordance with the original probability parameter. The computation of these pre-expectations is performed following the same rules as the wlp operator. The correctness of the transformation is established by the following theorem, which states that a program and its transformed version share the same terminating and nonterminating behavior. Theorem 7.1 (Correctness of Observation Hoisting). Let c ∈ cpGCL admit at least one feasible run for every initial state 11 and T (c, 1) = (ĉ,ĥ). Then, for all f ∈ E and д ∈ E ≤1 ,
Proof. By the alternative characterization of transformers cw(l)p (Equation (3)), the statement follows from the equationŝ
which are established by Lemma A.4 in Appendix A.5, taking h = 1.
A similar program transformation has been given for the programming language R2 in [42] . Let us point out some differences. R2 uses random assignments rather than probabilistic choices. Consequently, observe statements can only be hoisted until the occurrence of a random assignment. In our setting, observe statements are hoisted through probabilistic choices. This enables completely removing observe statements from programs. Another difference is, as discussed in more depth at the end of Section 4, the treatment of diverging programs. As R2 focuses on certainly terminating programs, the hoisting program transformation in [42] is correct for such programs. Our semantics treats possibly diverging programs too. The presented hoisting program transformation is correct for such programs as well. This is of relevance in a setting where it is not clear upfront whether a probabilistic program may diverge or not. Deciding whether a probabilistic program has a positive probability to diverge or not is as hard as the universal halting problem [32] ; it is thus beneficial that program transformations are generally applicable.
Replacing Observations by Loops
We now study an alternative approach for removing observations from programs while preserving their semantics. The approach can be seen as an instance of the rejection sampling method (RSM) applied to a conditional distribution [10, 47] . To understand the intuition behind this method, consider first this simpler problem: Assume Alice wants to simulate a six-sided die but to this end she has only (fair) coins. Can she still do it? The answer to the problem is "Yes, she can!" and the program on the right illustrates the solution. The body of the loop simulates a uniform distribution over the interval [1, 8] , which is repeatedly sampled (in variable i) until its outcome lies in the interval [1, 6] . The effect of the repeated sampling is precisely to condition the distribution of i to 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. As a result, Pr 
To apply this method to our original problem of removing program observations, we follow a similar idea: we repeatedly sample executions from the program until seeing an execution that passes all the observations. To implement this, we take the following steps: First, we introduce a flag unblocked that signals whether all observations along a program execution have been satisfied. We let variable unblocked be initially true and replace every statement observe (G) from the original program by the assignment unblocked := unblocked ∧ G. In this way, variable unblocked remains true until an observation is violated. Second, since program executions are no longer blocked on violating an observation, we need to modify the program to avoid any possible subsequent divergence. This is achieved by guarding abort statements and loops with variable unblocked. These adaptations are captured in detail by program transformation B in Figure 10(a) . Finally, we need to keep a permanent copy of the initial program state since every time we sample an execution, the program must start from its original initial state. All in all, this gives the unconditioned program rsm[c] depicted in Figure 10(b) , which simulates the behavior of the original program c. 12 There, 12 An implicit assumption here is that all expressions over program variables in rsm[c] are well defined. This hinders the application of the method for programs such as c = observe (x > 0); ite ( To illustrate the application of this method, reconsider the program c fish from Section 2. The equivalent program rsm[c fish ] is given on the right. In the general case, to prove that (the unconditioned program) rsm[c] correctly simulates (the conditioned program) c, we resort to the operational semantics from Section 6. However, we state the correctness of the simulation using the expectation transformer semantics so that we keep the presentation of all our results consistent. Proof. In Appendix A.6.
The underlying idea behind our program transformation c rsm[c] has also been exploited by [6] to reason about conditional probabilities over system models: given a Markov chain M and a conditionψ , they show how to construct a Markov chain M ψ such that the conditional probabilities in M agree with the (unconditional) probabilities in M ψ .
Taken together, Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 provide two different approaches to simulate observations using the remaining cpGCL constructs, under mild conditions of program feasibility. They show that observe statements are, to some degree, syntactic sugar.
Replacing Loops by Observations
In some circumstances, it is possible to apply a dual program transformation that replaces loops with observations. This is applicable when the set of states reached at the end of the different loop iterations are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d., for short). This is the case, e.g., for the earlier program c die that simulates a six-sided die. One can show that the program is semantically equivalent to the program on the right, where the effect of the loop is simulated by an observation. This kind of transformation is particularly useful because it reduces the program verification effort: it is usually easier to analyze a loop-free program with observations than a program with loops, whose analysis relies on loop invariants. In the sequel, let repeat {c} (G) be a shorthand for repeat c until (G).
The transformation allows replacing a loop with its body, followed by an observation conditioning to the loop guard, i.e., repeat {c} (G) with c; observe (G). To formally define the class of "i.i.d." loops to which the transformation applies, we require the notion of n-unrolling of a loop, given by the following clauses:
Applying transformer wp to both sides of the last equation yields
For our intended notion of "i.i.d." loop, the left summand above can be replaced with
because when executing repeat n+1 {c} (G), if G is not established after the first iteration, we can continue the execution from the initial state instead of the state reached after the (failed) iteration. This observation leads to our definition of i.i.d. loops below.
Definition 7.3 (i.i.d. Loop).
Given program c ∈ cpGCL and guard G, we say that loop
13
As so defined, proving a loop i.i.d. might seem somewhat involved. However, we can do this by means of a simple dataflow analysis. It is not hard to see that a loop is i.i.d. whenever there is no dataflow across its iterations. In program c die , this is a requirement one can readily check: we see that whenever a variable is set, its value is never read in a subsequent iteration.
The benefit of Definition 7.3 based on the finite approximations of a loop is that it immediately yields the following characterization of the semantics for the entire loop, which will lie at the heart of the correctness proof of the proposed transformation. 
Proof. We prove only the first equation; the second equation follows by a similar reasoning. Using a standard (continuity) argument, we can show that
and a simple induction over n gives
To conclude, we rely on the closed form 
Proof. Again, we consider only the first equation. By the alternative characterization of transformers cw(l)p (Equation (3)) and Lemma 7.4, we have
RELATED WORK
Weakest-Precondition Semantics of Probabilistic Programs. The foundation of the semantics of probabilistic programming languages goes back to the seminal work [37] . Kozen provided semantics for probabilistic programs and developed the probabilistic propositional dynamic logic [38] to reason about such programs. Whereas his work focused on fully probabilistic programs, [40] extended this with (demonic) nondeterminism. Their transformers wp[·] and wlp[·] are respectively denoted by · and [·] in Kozen's work, and represent (dual) modalities of probabilistic propositional dynamic logic. Probabilistic weakest precondition semantics has a corresponding backward abstraction in the setting of abstract interpretation [17] . These notions are backward compatible with Dijkstra's notions of weakest (liberal) preconditions; that is to say, for deterministic programs, Kozen's/McIver and Morgan's semantics coincide with that of Dijkstra. This article can be seen as an extension of these lines of work with the notion of conditioning. In particular, Theorem 4.7 shows that our conditional weakest precondition semantics conservatively extends [38, 40] . Mechanizations of weakest precondition semantics using theorem provers have been conducted in HOL [29] , Isabelle [16] , and Coq [3] . Extensions of the wp approach with conditioning have, to our knowledge, not yet been reported. However, a semiautomation based on bounded model checking of the operational semantics developed in this article is presented in [30] .
Relating Different Semantics. Relating several semantics of probabilistic programs is not new. [37] provided an interpretation in terms of functions on measurable spaces and as operators on a Banach space of measures and showed their correspondence. The correspondence between the weakest precondition semantics of [40] and an intuitive operational semantics in terms of Markov decision processes has been reported by [25] . Similar work for Dijkstra's guarded command language was published in [39] . Theorem 5.7 can be considered as an extension of these latter results to probabilistic programs with conditioning.
Nontermination and Nondeterminism. The main difference with existing semantics of modern probabilistic programming languages such as R2 [28, 42] is the explicit treatment of possible diverging programs in our setting. In fact, several recent works on probabilistic programming [9, 11, 48] assume programs to be almost surely or even always terminating. For certain applications, the restriction to terminating programs is understandable; for a semantics of a general-purpose language, we believe that possible divergence needs to be treated.
Our operational semantics deals with conditioning and nondeterminism. It was shown that conditioning and nondeterminism cannot both be covered by an inductive wp semantics. This result is related to the fact that for conditional probabilities in Markov decision processes, memoryless schedulers (schedulers that on every visit to a state always make the same decision) are insufficient. Instead, history-dependent schedulers are needed; see [2, 6] . In fact, [52] already noticed the difficulties that arise when trying to integrate nondeterminism and probabilities, even in the absence of conditioning. Nondeterminism in probabilistic programs has been studied extensively by [40] ; current practical programming languages such as R2, webPPL, and so forth do not incorporate this. We believe that nondeterminism is an essential feature for probabilistic programs and is not just of theoretical interest. For instance, abstraction of program variables typically gives rise to nondeterminism. Capturing nondeterminism, conditioning, and probabilistic choice (or sampling) in a single semantic framework enables the formal reasoning about such abstract probabilistic programs. In addition, it provides a stepping stone toward reasoning about concurrent programs where a viable approach is to treat concurrency by interleaving (i.e., nondeterminism). [24] mentions the treatment of nondeterminism as a challenging problem in probabilistic programming. This article only considered demonic nondeterminism. An operational semantics for a probabilistic programming language that contains both angelic and demonic nondeterminism has been given in [14] . They consider stochastic two-player games as an operational model, one type of player per form of nondeterminism, but do not consider conditioning.
Conditioning. One of the main motivations behind modern probabilistic programming languages is the ability to condition the program runs on certain events, a feature that is at the heart of Bayesian networks. There are several syntactic ways in which this can be incorporated. [26] considered conditioning in a probabilistic constraint programming language with recursion and showed how conditional probabilities in their setting can be computed. (Computing conditional probabilities in general is undecidable as shown in [1] .) In this article, we have adopted the observe statements from [9] that nowadays have been adopted by various languages. The observe statement is related to assertions. Both observe (G) and assert (G) block all program executions violating G. However, observe (G) normalizes the probability of the unblocked executions, while assert (G) does not, yielding a subdistribution of total mass possibly less than one. assert statements correspond to the tests in the probabilistic propositional dynamic logic [38] . An alternative-quantitative-interpretation of assert statements is also studied in [48] . There, assertions are accompanied by a confidence value c and a probability value p, meaning that with confidence c, the assertion holds with probability (at least) p. Assertions in probabilistic programs have also been treated in [12] , where the analysis takes places using martingale theory. [9] consider conditioning in the setting of functional languages and base their semantics on monads. Although their semantics covers conditioning on zero-probability events, unbounded loops are not considered. [42] and [9] consider observe statements for certainly terminating programs. Our wp semantics coincides for terminating programs; we have discussed in detail at the end of Section 4 that adopting the R2 semantics to possibly diverging programs leads to somewhat counterintuitive results.
Program Transformations. Most program transformations for probabilistic programs, such as slicing [28] , aim to accelerate the Markov Chain Monte Carlo analysis. The transformations in this article aim at treating conditioning. Our program transformation to "hoist" the observe statements through the program while updating the probabilistic choices is similar in spirit to [42] . As we use probabilistic choices and not random assignments, we are able to completely remove conditioning from a program. In addition, as our semantics covers diverging programs as well, our transformation is applicable to nonterminating programs. The program transformation that replaces an observe statement by a loop is in fact a direct application of the principle of the rejection sampling method to conditional distributions. This has also been studied by, e.g., Shoup [49, Section 9] under the name of "generate and test" paradigm. As rejection sampling is the de facto semantics for inference on most practical probabilistic programming languages, this connection shows that our wp semantics is an alternative to this. The idea to rerun a program until all observations are passed is used by [6] to automate the verification of conditioned temporal logic formulas in Markov models. Our final transformation to replace a loop by an observe statement has a strong resemblance with observations made in some textbooks on randomized algorithms; e.g., Theorem 7.5, which states the correctness of our transformation, corresponds to [49, Theorem 9.3.(iii)].
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This article presented an in-depth study of the notion of conditioning in a simple imperative probabilistic programming language. Both a weakest-precondition and an operational semantics have been provided. Their relation has been established. The key is to consider the weakest-precondition semantics as a pair in which the probability to diverge or to violate one (or more) observations in the program is kept separately. This allows for treating possibly diverging programs and conditioning on zero-probability events. It was shown that incorporating nondeterminism in the inductive weakest-preconditioning setting is impossible. This raises the question how to deal with the combination of nondeterminism and conditioning in a wp-style framework. The semantics have been used to prove the correctness of three program transformations, two of which remove conditioning, while one replaces a loop by an observe. An extension of both our semantics to recursive probabilistic programs with conditioning can be readily obtained based on the recent work [43] . Issues for future work include the treatment of continuous distributions, and the (semi-)automated synthesis of loop invariants. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate to what extent existing techniques for loop-invariant synthesis in probabilistic programs [7, 13, 35] can be lifted to the setting with conditioning. For continuous distributions, the operational semantics is no longer a Markov chain, but rather a stochastic relation. In addition, a wp semantics for continuous distributions requires measure theory; recent work in that direction has been reported in [50] . We also plan to investigate the usage of our weakest-precondition framework to reason about entropy and secrecy where conditioning plays a crucial role [21] . . Now let H 1 (H 2 , respectively) be the first (second, respectively) projection of H . Since the value of H 1 (X 1 , X 2 ) (H 2 (X 1 , X 2 ), respectively) does not depend on X 2 (X 1 , respectively) and
we can derive the continuity of both projections from the continuity of wp and wlp (Lemma A.1). Since H 1 and H 2 are continuous, Bekić's Theorem [8] says that the least fixed point of H is given by ( X 1 , X 2 ), where 
Proof. We begin with Equation (8) . The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of c. Except for the case of observations, the proof argument for all other program constructs follows the same idea as employed in [25, Theorem 23] . For c = observe (G), we distinguish two cases. In Case 1, we have s |= G, the OMRC R The case of loops is not thoroughly treated in [25] as the authors do not argue why the fact that Equation (8) holds for the finite unrollings of a loop implies that it also holds for the entire loop. For the sake of completeness, we provide herein a full proof argument. Assume c = while (G) {c }. Since transformer wp is continuous, its action on a loop coincides with the limit of its action on the finite unrollings (see 14 If transitions have probability 1, we omit this in our figures. Moreover, all states-with the exception of sink -are left out if they are not reachable from the initial state.
we make a case distinction between those states that are mapped byĥ to a positive number and those that are mapped to zero. In the first case, i.e., ifĥ(s) > 0, we reason as follows: To prove Equation (12), we apply the IH 12 on c 1 and c 2 : · h · f , the equation can be rewritten asĥ · lfp(H ) = lfp(I ) and a straightforward argument using the Kleene fixed-point theorem (and the continuity of wp established in Lemma A.1) shows that it is entailed by ∀n•ĥ · H n (0) = I n (0). We prove this statement by induction on n. The case n = 0 is trivial. For the inductive case we reason as follows: We now turn to proving Equation (12):
